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Schwartz are similar insofar as they
are both "based upon the
assumption that a toxic substance
acts immediately upon the body to
produce injury," RSI cases are
distinguishable in this respect. The
court in the present case held that
"the justifications that gave rise to
the exposure rule do not apply" in
RSI cases because a keyboard is not
"an inherently toxic or dangerous
substance." Someone who touches
or uses a keyboard is not doomed to
contract RSI; rather, RSI results
from "an accumulation of events."
The court weighed several other
policy considerations in reaching its
final ruling. The court noted a
balance between "a defendant's
interest in repose" and "the injured
person's interest in having a
reasonable opportunity to assert a
claim." In addressing these two
policy objectives, the court noted
that there was a possibility of false
claims in cases where "excessive
factual inquiries would be
necessary." The court also
mentioned the difficulty of tracing
the history of latent injuries. A
related policy the court considered
was that defendants have an extra
burden in RSI cases since the
history of a latent injury is difficult
to trace. The court further
recognized the possibility of a
"causal break" between a
defendant's alleged negligence and
a plaintiff's claimed injury.
Additional considerations included
the promotion of justice, stability to
human affairs, judicial economy,
self-reformation by defendants, and
possible unfairness to defendants
who might have to defend against
stale claims, and questions of
credibility and professional
diagnostic judgment.
In its final analysis, the court
concluded that the cause of action
for a keyboard user inflicted by RSI
accrues when the user first
experiences symptoms of RSI or
when he last used a keyboard,
whichever happened earlier. The
court noted that RSI cases pose
certain problems of proof. The court
explained, however, that it had tried
to find the "proper balance between
giving a plaintiff an opportunity to
commence an action after becoming
aware of a symptom of injury and
providing certainty and
predictability to manufacturers,
employers and other economic
actors in their risk assessment,
while also avoiding stale claims." In
sum, the Court of Appeals of New
York answered the certified
question in the negative, remitted
the case to the Supreme Court of
New York, and ordered the Supreme
Court to rule on RSI cases in
accordance with its the ruling.
Pharmacies Charge Prescription Drugs Manufacturers
and Wholesalers with Antitrust Violations Through
Price-Fixing Conspiracy
By Karina Zabicki
In In re Brand Name
Prescription Drugs Antitrust
Litigation, 123 F.3d 599 (7th Cir.
1997), the United States Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
reversed the decision of the
Northern District Court of Illinois,
holding: (1) indirect purchasers
may not bring suit against
manufacturers in federal court for
an overcharge that direct purchasers
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allegedly passed on to the indirect
purchasers; (2) sufficient evidence
existed to create a jury issue of
whether the direct purchasers were
participants in a price-fixing
conspiracy; (3) a suit brought in an
Alabama state court claiming a
violation of state antitrust laws
defeated the application of the
"artful pleading" doctrine; and (4) a
newly-merged company which
abandoned its predecessor's
participation in the alleged
conspiracy did not clear it of
liability for its predecessor's
antitrust violations.
This litigation involved hundreds
of price-fixing cases brought under
Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15
U.S.C. § 1. Plaintiffs and
Defendants appealed four of these
rulings, which the Seventh Circuit
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consolidated into a single appeal.
Retail pharmacies brought suit
against manufacturers and
wholesalers of prescription drugs,
complaining that the wholesalers
and manufacturers conspired to
deny discounts for brand name
drugs to all pharmacies while
granting these discounts to favored
customers. The pharmacies alleged
that Defendants conspired to fix the
pharmacies' prices by using a
"chargeback system."
Chargeback System Allowed
Manufacturers to Give
Discounts Below Wholesale
Price to Selected Groups
Under the chargeback system,
manufacturers contracted with
favored customers, such as
hospitals, HMOs, nursing homes,
and mail order companies, to set the
discounted price at which favored
customers could buy prescription
drugs from wholesalers. The
wholesalers bought the drugs at full
price from the manufacturers and
later sold the drugs to one of these
favored customers. The
manufacturers then reimbursed the
wholesalers for the difference
between the full wholesale price and
the discounted wholesale price.
Under this system, wholesalers
could only give discounts to
customers with whom the
manufacturers had negotiated a
lower price. Additionally, this
system prevented the favored
customers from engaging in
arbitrage, a process in which the
favored customers over-ordered
drugs in order to create their own
surplus which they then resold to
pharmacies that were not granted
favored customer status.
The favored customers created a
win-win situation for both
themselves and the pharmacies
when they resold their surplus for a
price between the discounted
wholesale price and the regular
wholesale price. For example, if the
regular wholesale price was $100,
the pharmacies would be forced to
pay this full amount when buying
directly from the wholesalers.
However, the favored customer, who
paid a discounted wholesale price
of, say, $75, could sell any surplus
to the pharmacies for any price
between $75 and $100 and still
realize a profit. As a result, the
manufacturers lost money by being
underbid by the favored groups who
sold their surplus to the pharmacies.
Plaintiffs argued that
manufacturers created the
chargeback system to employ price
discrimination between customers
and prevent underbidding. Under
the system, the manufacturers
would allow wholesalers to give a
discount only to those whom the
manufacturers had chosen to receive
a discount.
Pharmacies Objected to the
Effect of Price
Discrimination
Plaintiffs argued that the high
prices they paid for the drugs were
not the result of individual
manufacturers responding to the
market forces, but the result of a
collusive effort. Plaintiffs produced
evidence showing that the
manufacturers and the wholesalers
agreed among themselves to use the
chargeback system to prevent the
pharmacies from obtaining
discounts. Plaintiffs objected that,
but for this alleged conspiracy, the
drug prices would fall due to market
competition.
In response to this claim, the
manufacturers argued that Plaintiffs
had not produced sufficient
evidence of collusion to justify a
trial for a Sherman Act violation
and moved for summary judgment.
This decision was not appealed.
Instead, the district court made four
other findings that were appealed.
First, the district court refused to
dismiss the pharmacies' "indirect
purchaser" claims, which
maintained that the pharmacies
were overcharged because of
Defendants' alleged conspiracy.
Manufacturers had moved to
dismiss the pharmacies' Sherman
Act claim for overcharges by
arguing that only parties who
purchased drugs directly from the
manufacturer, such as wholesalers,
could bring such an action. Because
the pharmacies were indirect
purchasers who did not buy directly
from the manufacturers, but rather
bought from the wholesalers, they
would not have standing to bring an
overcharge claim. Second, the
district court refused to remand a
class action that alleged violation of
Alabama's antitrust statute which,
contrary to federal law, expressly
authorizes suits by indirect
purchasers. Third, the district court
granted summary judgment to the
wholesaler Defendants, concluding
there was not enough evidence of
collusion with the manufacturers.
Finally, the district court granted
summary judgment to one of the
manufacturers, DuPont Merck
Pharmaceutical Company, because
DuPont's pharmaceutical division
was taken over by DuPont Merck
two years after the beginning of the
alleged conspiracy, at which time
DuPont Merck immediately stopped
the discounting practices. The
Seventh Circuit discussed each of
the four issues separately.
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Pharmacies Could Not Sue
Man ufacturers for Antitrust
Violations Because They are
Indirect Purchasers
First, the court addressed
whether the district court should
have dismissed the indirect
purchasers' conspiracy claim. The
pharmacies had argued that they
should be able to recover damages
from the manufacturers for being
overcharged by the wholesalers. The
pharmacies asserted that the
manufacturers were responsible for
the pharmacies being overcharged
because the chargeback system
forced the wholesalers to overcharge
non-favored customers. Although
wholesalers were reimbursed by the
manufacturers for any discount the
wholesalers gave to favored
customers, wholesalers could not
recover the difference between the
wholesale drug price and any
discount that the wholesalers gave
to non-favored customers. The
district court had determined that
because the wholesalers were
nothing more than the
manufacturers' "glorified
warehouses," or strawmen, the
pharmacies were essentially the
direct purchasers.
The appellate court turned to
case law to address this issue. In
Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431
U.S. 720 (1977), the United States
Supreme Court held that only direct
purchasers, not indirect purchasers,
could sue manufacturers for
antitrust violations because of the
practical difficulty of tracing and
apportioning price fixing damages
through successive layers of
purchasers. The Court recognized
one exception to the indirect
purchaser rule-when "the direct
purchaser is owned or controlled by
its customer." Illinois Brick, 431
U.S. at 736 n. 16. The Seventh
Circuit also posited another
exception to the Brick doctrine-
when the customer is controlled by
the direct purchaser. However,
because the wholesalers in the
present case were not owned or
controlled by the manufacturers, the
first exception was inapplicable.
This exception did not apply
because only the wholesalers
themselves could sue the
manufacturers for overcharging the
wholesalers. Therefore, the Seventh
Circuit reversed the district court
and held that the pharmacies'
indirect purchaser overcharge
claims against the manufacturers
should have been dismissed.
State Class Action Suit
Removed to Federal Court
Should be Remanded to State
Court
The second issue the court
considered involved a class action
suit that claimed to be based on an
Alabama statute modeled after the
Sherman Act, which was filed on
behalf of consumers in several
states. There was a crucial
difference between these state and
federal statutes because the state
statute authorized indirect-
purchaser claims, whereas the
federal statute barred claims by
indirect purchasers under Illinois
Brick. Because Illinois Brick
favored Defendants, they had
removed the case from state court to
federal court. Plaintiffs, on the other
hand, wanted the case remanded,
but the district court denied their
request to remand and Plaintiffs
subsequently appealed.
A federal court has jurisdiction
over cases involving party diversity
or federal questions. In reviewing
removal based on diversity, the
appellate court found complete
diversity between the parties but
found that Defendants could not
show that Plaintiffs met the
statutory minimum amount of
$50,000 damages in a diversity
action. Because Defendants
introduced no evidence that any of
the named Plaintiffs individually
met, or could have met this
statutory minimum, Defendants
needed another way to meet the
requirement. Because Plaintiffs
were also seeking injunctive relief,
the minimum statutory amount
could have been met if Defendants
could prove that the injunction
imposed a cost of compliance in
excess of $50,000.
The court specified four ways in
which Defendants could establish
that an injunction would meet the
statutory minimum. These included:
(1) the anticipated value to the
Plaintiffs of granting the injunction
would exceed the required
minimum amount; (2) the
injunction would cause Defendants
to change a way of doing business
which would cost the statutory
minimum amount; (3) by
complying with the injunction,
defendants would have to sacrifice
some benefit worth more than the
minimum amount in controversy; or
(4) the ministerial or clerical costs
resulting from compliance by
Defendants might carry a case
across the threshold. The only one
of these four alternatives that
Defendants attempted to prove was
the fourth option regarding clerical
costs. The court held that because
Defendants failed to produce
evidence quantifying the cost of
compliance, Defendants could not
prove that the federal court had
appropriate jurisdiction.
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The district court had also
allowed the removal of the state suit
to the federal court based on another
jurisdictional theory called the
"artful pleading" doctrine, which
the appellate court proceeded to
analyze. The doctrine usually
applies in a situation where federal
law has preempted an area of
dispute so as to make state law an
inappropriate source for a remedy to
resolve the dispute. "Artful
pleading" describes a plaintiff's
often underhanded attempt to
artfully cast "essentially federal law
claims as state law claims," perhaps
by evading reference to any federal
law. Using artful pleading, a
plaintiff would attempt to keep his
or her claim in state court to avoid
certain consequences unique to
federal courts applying federal law.
Courts use the doctrine to ferret out
plaintiffs who bring state law claims
in an effort to circumvent federal
law where federal law has
dominated the area of dispute.
Therefore courts, like the district
court in this case, allow removal of
a state law claim to federal court
even though diversity or a federal
question may be lacking.
The appellate court disagreed
with the district court's assessment
of the artful pleading doctrine. The
court reasoned that although
Plaintiff's only motive for filing a
claim under a state statute was to
circumvent the Illinois Brick
doctrine, invoking the artful
pleading doctrine would have been
proper only if the Plaintiffs had no
other possible relief in state court.
However, the appellate court
explained that there was a means of
relief, however tenuous, in filing the
case in state court by invoking
Alabama antitrust law. In its
analysis, the court found that the
Alabama antitrust statute may apply
to the case at bar even though it
involved Plaintiffs from more than
one state. Defendant wholesalers
argued that Alabama's antitrust
statute was limited to intrastate
commerce; therefore, Plaintiffs had
to invoke federal antitrust laws. The
court agreed that if the present case
had challenged sales from other
states to pharmacies outside of
Alabama, an example of pure
interstate commerce, then Alabama
law would not apply because a state
could not have regulated sales that
took place wholly outside it.
However, because the present case
challenged sales from other states to
pharmacies in Alabama, the court
found that this type of suit fell into
the permissible scope of the
Alabama antitrust statute. The court
held that the case could defeat the
artful pleading doctrine because it
had merit, and the district court
erred in denying the motion to
remand the suit to the Alabama
state court.
Enough Evidence Existed
Against Wholesalers to
Preclude Their Dismissal
from Suit
The next issue the Seventh
Circuit examined was whether
Plaintiffs produced enough evidence
to establish a jury issue of whether
the wholesalers were part of a price-
fixing conspiracy. The wholesaler
Defendants claimed that "it would
have been contrary to their
economic self interest for them to
have joined a conspiracy that
prevent[ed] them from selling at a
discounted price to pharmacies."
However, pretrial discovery
demonstrated that wholesalers had
incentives to commit to the
conspiracy, namely, to make sure
the wholesalers were not pushed out
as middlemen by the manufacturers
dealing directly with customers.
The court reversed the district court
and held that regardless of whether
Plaintiffs' theory was true, there
was enough evidence to defeat a
motion for summary judgment.
DuPont Merck Obligated to
Pay for Sins of its
Predecessor
Finally, the court determined
whether the district court properly
carved out DuPont Merck from
Plaintiffs' claims of a conspiracy.
DuPont Merck was formed as a
result of the joint venture between
DuPont and Merck, which took
place two years after the alleged
conspiracy began. The new venture
abandoned participation in the
chargeback system as soon as it was
formed. Based on this fact, DuPont
Merck argued that it had cut its ties
with the manufacturers who
participated in the alleged
conspiracy and thus was not
properly joined as a defendant. The
appellate court disagreed. It held
that there was enough contrary
evidence to preclude summary
judgment in DuPont's favor.
DuPont Merck was liable for the
company's antitrust violations prior
to the merger because it had not
adequately cut its ties to those still
involved with the conspiracy. The
court reasoned it was not enough to
merely change policies and cease
involvement to adequately withdraw
from a conspiracy. Rather, to guard
against liability, a company's
withdrawal must have been
accompanied by either disclosure of
the conspiracy to the authorities or
an announcement of the withdrawal
to any coconspirators. Because it
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appeared that DuPont Merck
silently withdrew, the court found it
was not free from the ramifications
of the alleged conspiracy. Therefore,
the court reversed the district court
and held that DuPont Merck had
been improperly dismissed.
In conclusion, the Seventh
Circuit reversed the four rulings of
the district court, which Plaintiffs
appealed from by holding that: (1)
indirect purchasers were barred
from filing suit against
manufacturers under federal law;
(2) the class action suit filed
pursuant to Alabama antitrust law
should have been remanded to state
court; (3) the wholesalers were
improperly dropped as defendants;
and (4) DuPont Merck was
improperly dismissed as a
defendant.
California Judicial Candidate Requirements Did Not
Violate the U.S. Constitution
By Sara Marzullo
In NAACP v. Jones, 131 F.3d
1317 (9th Cir. 1997), the United
States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit held that Los Angeles
County's (the "County")
reimbursement system (the
"system"), which requires judicial
candidates to reimburse the County
for printing their candidate
statements in the Official Sample
Ballot and Voter Information
Booklet and which does not provide
public funding for campaigns, does
not violate the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment or any fundamental
right under the First Amendment.
Each judicial candidate may
print a 200-word statement in the
Official Sample Ballot which is
circulated to every voter in the
County that describes his or her
background and position on the
issues. Under a practice known as
the "cost-reimbursement
requirement," however, all judicial
candidates may be required to
reimburse the County for the
printing costs of their statements in
the Official Sample Ballot and Voter
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Information Booklet. By statute, the
County Board of Supervisors can
decide each campaign year whether
judicial candidates will have to
reimburse the County for the costs
of printing. See CAL. ELEC. CODE §
13307 (West 1997). When the
Supervisors require these cost-
reimbursement payments, these
payments do not fund elections, and
the County may not retain them.
In response to the cost-
reimbursement requirement, the
NAACP, Charles Lindner (a former
candidate), and voters of the County
("Plaintiffs") brought suit against
the Secretary of State of California,
Bill Jones, and other County
officials ("Defendants"). Plaintiffs
alleged that the County's campaign
rules created a "wealth primary"
forcing candidates to spend a
significant amount of money to run
a meaningful campaign.
Plaintiffs argued that the "wealth
primary" violated the First
Amendment and the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, and they sought
declaratory and injunctive relief.
Plaintiffs contended that the County
should print every candidate's
statement free of charge and create
a public fund for potential
candidates that would allow them to
run meaningful campaigns.
The district court dismissed
Plaintiffs' claims against Secretary
of State Jones pursuant to Fed. R.
Civ. P. 12(b)(6) for failure to plead
with specificity. In particular,
Plaintiffs failed to plead specific
incidents showing Jones violated
their rights. In addition, the district
court dismissed Plaintiffs' claims
against the other Defendants for
lack of standing because they failed
to allege an "injury in fact."
Plaintiffs also brought state law
claims but did not appeal them.
No "Heightened Scrutiny"
Applied
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit first
determined whether it should
analyze Plaintiff's equal protection
claim by using a "heightened
scrutiny analysis." Courts apply a
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